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TECHNICAL FLAWS IN THE APPLICATION
OF THE U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW:
THE EXPERIENCE OF U.S.-KOREAN TRADE
ROBERT W. MCGEE AND YEOMIN YOON*
1. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. antidumping law suffers from a series of defects
in its implementation, resulting in the unwarranted finding of
illegal predatory pricing by foreign companies. In light of the
existing technical flaws outlined in this Article, it is clear that
the U.S. antidumping law is merely a form of protectionism,
designed to serve the interests of domestic industry at the
expense of consumers.
This Article briefly profiles the U.S. antidumping law in
light of the U.S.-Korean trade experience. Section 2 provides
background information on the U.S. antidumping law. Section
3 discusses the current U.S.-Korean trade policy. Section 4
analyzes some of the shortcomings of the U.S. law, using the
U.S. relationship with Korea as a model for understanding
these problems. Section 5 discusses the threat that the
existing antidumping law poses as a means of harassing
Section 6 addresses the effects of
foreign producers.
antidumping that are often overlooked by policy makers. In
light of both the protectionist nature of the statute as well as
the defects in the implementation of the statute, this Article
concludes that a reexamination of the U.S. antidumping law
is necessary, and that an outright repeal should be considered.
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Business, Seton Hall University. The authors wish to thank Vivian Lugo,
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2. U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW
Traditionally, dumping is defined as selling an
internationally traded good at a lower price in one national
market than in another.' By dumping, an international firm
can increase its profits by discriminating among customers,
charging different customers different prices for virtually
identical products.2 For example, if some consumers are
willing to pay $10 for widgets and others are willing to pay
$15, a firm will maximize its profits if it can successfully
charge a higher price to the consumer who is willing to pay
more. In general, domestic producers are harmed by dumping
policies because when the price of dumped goods falls below
the price of domestically produced goods, domestic consumers
buy the foreign goods.
Consumers, however, are the
beneficiaries of these lower priced goods.
There is a
widespread view among international trade experts that the
purpose of the antidumping duties imposed by the United
States is to protect domestic industries from competition.'
According to the conventional theory upon which the
antidumping law is based, foreign companies should be
assessed for dumping if their purpose is to limit competition by
driving other producers out of the domestic market. A number
of commentators have concluded, however, that predatory
pricing either does not exist, or exists only rarely. If predatory
pricing does exist, it only inures to the benefit of consumers.4

'See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 502 (6th ed. 1990).
2 See JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 654 (2d ed. 1986).

' See Tracy Murray, The Administration of the Antidumping Duty Law
by the Departmentof Commerce, in DOWN IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION
OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS 23, 44 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds.,
1991).
4 See generally Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, PredatoryPricingand
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
697-733 (1975); ROBERT J. CARBAUGH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 162
(1992); Franklin M. Fisher, On Predation and Victimless Crime, 32
ANTITRUST BULL. 85-92 (1987); Ronald H. Koller, The Myth of Predatory
Pricing: An EmpiricalStudy, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105-23 (1971);
John S. McGee, PredatoryPrice Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1
J.L. ECON. 137-69 (1958); Robert W. McGee, When is PricingPredatory? 2
J. PRICING MGMT 40-43 (1991); Russell Pittman, On Predation and
Victimless Crime: A Comment, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 231-34 (1989).
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2.1. The U.S. Statute
Since the Revenue Act of 1916,r the United States has
enacted numerous trade laws and regulations aimed at
protecting various domestic industries from "unfair"
competition. The present antidumping law in the United
States is based on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.6 In
essence, if imported goods are sold at "less than fair value"
and "an industry in the United States is (i) materially injured,
or (ii) is threatened with material injury," then the United
States assesses a dumping duty equivalent to the amount by
which the "foreign market value" exceeds the U.S. price.'
The Trade Agreements Act has been modified over the past
several years. The most significant change was the 1984
amendment which requires an assessment of the injuries to
domestic companies from alleged dumping by examining the
prices of competing imports.'
In addition, Congress has
recently shifted the administration of the antidumping law
from the Treasury Department to the Commerce Department,
indicating Congressional intent to aggressively impose
dumping duties
2.2. Administration of the Antidumping Law
Antidumping actions may be initiated by a manufacturer
that produces a product similar to the good allegedly being
dumped. Once a petition is filed, the Commerce Department
begins an inquiry, which usually involves sending
questionnaires and requests for documents to the companies
that are allegedly dumping.'0 The Commerce Department

6 See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 800-01, 39 Stat. 798 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982)). The statute is sometimes referred to as the
Antidumping Duty Act of 1916. See Michael S. Knoll, United States
Antidumping Law: The Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 265,
268 (1987). Richard Dale points out that the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890)
and § 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894 could have been applied to
dumping situations. See RICHARD DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL
TRADE ORDER 12 (1980).
' Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1993).
7
1d. § 1673.
" See Knoll, supra note 5, at 269-70 & n.31 (1987).
9
JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD 114 (1991).
' 0 See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 675.
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has the sole authority to prescribe the format of the reply, the
time within which a reply must be made and is the sole judge
of the adequacy of the reply." The Commerce Department
also is the ultimate decision-maker in the underlying matter
for which the information is sought.
The administration of this system has been criticized for
making unreasonable demands on foreign producers for
data.'" For example, the Commerce Department imposed a
115% dumping duty on uranium imports from six republics of
the former Soviet Union 3 for a period of time that predates
the separate political existence of these republics.' 4 In effect,
the Commerce Department held the six republics responsible
for the pricing behavior of the former Soviet Union. As part of
its investigation, the Commerce Department sent the six
governments a sixty-six page questionnaire in English,
demanding detailed information regarding their uranium
operations. 5 The Commerce Department concluded that the
six republics were involved in dumping activities despite the
republics' inability to defend themselves by complying with the
document requests.'" The Ministry of Atomic Power and
Industry of the Soviet Union could have provided the
information, but it had been abolished a few months earlier.
In
addition, much of the information was highly
confidential.'
This example illustrates how the information demanded by
the Commerce Department can be highly burdensome for
producers.
The Commerce Department can demand a
tremendous amount of information, subsequently leaving

1 Id
See, e.g., James Bovard, U.S. ProtectionistsClaim a Russian Victim,
WALL ST. J., June 8, 1992, at A-10.
"sSee i&! For more on the antidumping investigation that was filed in
November, 1991 against Soviet uranium importers by U.S. mining interests,
see U.S. GEN. AcCT. OFF., GAO/RCED-92-194, URANIUM ENRICHMENT.
12

UNSOLVED TRADE ISSUES LEAVE UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR U.S. URANIUM
INDUSTRY (1992); Uranium from the U.S.S.R., USITC Pub. 2471, Inv. No.

731-TA-539 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2471] (preliminary
determination).
14 See Bovard, supra note 12.
16 Id
16 I.d,

17 ICL
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foreign producers in a double-bind. In essence, it appears that
any refusal to comply is regarded as a confession of dumping,
resulting in the imposition of the highest possible dumping
margins.
Foreign producers may choose not to comply,
however, because the Commerce Department has often
permitted confidential information to slip into the hands of
U.S. competitors.'"
Another difficulty with the administration of the U.S.
antidumping law is that it is jointly administered. This
overlapping jurisdiction of both the Commerce Department and
the United States International Trade Commission ("ITC") has
resulted in confusion regarding each agency's function. 9 The
Commerce Department initiates antidumping investigations,
determines whether there has been dumping or subsidization,
and publishes the resulting orders. Simultaneously, the ITC
determines whether a domestic industry has been materially
injured or threatened with injury, or whether the growth of a
domestic industry is being materially retarded. The statute
and existing case law grant the Commerce Department the
sole authority 'to determine standing.2"
It is the ITC,
however, which is charged with the authority for
defining the relevant domestic industry and assessing
whether that industry has been materially injured.
This appears to be an anomaly, because the [ITC], the
agency with the most detailed information about a
particular industry, is precluded from evaluating a
party's standing to petition on behalf of that industry.
As a result, it could be argued that the Tariff Act
cannot have granted the Commerce Department the
sole authority to determine standing questions and that

"8James Bovard, No JusticeinAnti-Dumping, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1990,
at F13.
"' See, e.g., Algoma Steel Corp., Ltd. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 241
(Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989).
"*At least two commentators take the position that the Commerce
Department has the sole statutory power to make standing determinations.
See Edwin J. Madaj & Charles H. Nalls, Bifurcation Without Direction: The
United States International Trade Commission and the Question of
PetitionerStandingin Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Cases, 22 LAW
& POLVY INTL Bus. 673 (1991).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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the [ITC] must also have such authority. 1
From the time a petition is filed, the law requires the
Commerce Department to make a preliminary determination
as to standing within 160 days and make a final determination
within another 75 days.22 The Commerce Department,
however, may extend a preliminary antidumping investigation
for 50 more days and the final determination for 60 days,
under certain circumstances." The final determination by
the ITC as to material injury must be made within 390 days
after the petition is filed.2 4 Both the ITC and the Commerce
Department must agree that a U.S. industry has been
materially injured before a dumping violation can be found. If
either the ITC or the Commerce Department finds otherwise,
no dumping margin is established.
3. THE U.S.-KOREAN TRADE RELATIONSHIP
In recent years, the trade relationship between the United
States and Korea has become prominent. Korea is now the
eighth largest trading partner of the United States, and the
United States is the largest trading partner of Korea.
Trade between these two countries has increased rapidly in
the past quarter-century because of the industrialization of
Korea. As a result of export-oriented industrialization, the per
capita GNP grew to nearly $7,466 in 1993,26 a dramatic
contrast to the meager $80 per capita GNP in 1961. Korea has
been called
"tomorrow's power house" and "Asia's next
28
giant."

21 I1&at 674.
22 See 1930 Tariff Act, §§ 733, 735, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673b (West 1980 &

Supp.
1993).
3
See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 676.
24
See U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF STATUTORY
PROVISIONS RELATED TO IMPORT RELIEF 8-16 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
International Trade Commission, n.d.).
25 KOREA ECON. REP., Sept. 1993, at 22 col. 1.
26 KOREAN CENT. DAILY, Mar. 26, 1994, at 1.
27 Louis Kraar, Korea: Tomorrow's Powerhouse, FORTUNE, Aug. 15, 1988,
at 75,
75.
2
1 See ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989).
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3.1. U.S. Trade Barriersto Korean Exports
While the United States has been one of the most open
economies in the world, 9 it continues to impede trade with
high tariffs, import quotas, and administered protection.
Although the average U.S. tariff is small and now stands at
about 5%, tariffs remain large for a number of industries.
These industries typically involve goods that are laborintensive and production-intensive. The average U.S. tariff on
textiles is 11%, while the average rate on apparel is 20% and
may be as high as 35%."0 Tariff rates on footwear range from
10% to 40%, while tariffs on leather goods such as gloves,
handbags and luggage range from 12% to 16%."' Korea's
comparative advantage vis a vis the United States depends at
least partially on the production of these types of goods.
Korea's exports of apparel, textiles, footwear, and leather
products accounted for nearly 40% of its total exports to the
United States in 1991.
These high U.S. tariff rates
significantly impede Korean exports to the United States.
In addition to high tariffs, the United States also employs
quantitative restrictions to limit imports. Two of these
quantitative restrictions are of particular importance to Korea.
First, the Multifiber Arrangement ("MFA") is a system of
bilateral quantitative restraints used to limit textile and
apparel imports from developing countries. The United States
has negotiated several bilateral agreements with Korea,
restricting textile and apparel exports from Korea to an annual
growth rate of 1%.3" This restriction has contributed to the
decline of Korea's share of textile and apparel exports to the

According to the estimate by the Korean Central Daily, one of the
leading newspapers in Seoul (with daily circulation of eight million copies),
the "degree of trade liberalization" as of the end of 1992 was 78% for the
United States, 58% for Korea, 54% for Japan, 80% for Germany, 88% for
Singapore, and 89% for Hong Kong, respectively. Joongang Ilbo, What are
the CharacteristicsofDeveloped Countries?,KOREAN CENT. DAILY, Sept. 22,
1993, at 5.
"0The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints, Phase I:
Manufacturing, USITC Pub. 2222, Inv.No. 332-262, at 4-2 and 4-3 (Oct.
1989) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2222 (report to the Senate Committee on
Finance) (table showing the percentage tariff rates for textiles and apparel).
31 Id at 2-7.
3 Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 41st Rep., USITC Pub.
2317
(Sept.
at 321. Repository, 2014
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United States.3
The second important quantitative restraint involves the
steel industry, which accounts for a significant portion of
Korea's total exports to the United States. 4 Steel trade
between the United States and Korea has been reduced to
5.3%, and in the absence of a Multilateral Steel Agreement
("MSA"), more restrictive measures are likely to impede the
steel trade between the United States and Korea.
Over the past decade, a number of Korean industries have
been investigated for allegedly dumping their products'in the
United States by selling goods at prices that are too low.35
3.2. Korean Trade BarriersTo U.S. Exports
Prior to the Tariff Reduction Plan announced in 1988,
Korea's average tariff rate was about 21%, only a slight
decrease from the 25% rate in 1979.6 By 1991, the Korean
trade reforms adopted in 1988 had reduced the average tariff
rate in Korea to 11.4%." Further reforms should drive the
average tariff rate down to 7.9% by the end of 1994." s These

8 Between 1989 and 1991, Korea's share of all U.S. imports subject to
the MFA declined from 11% to 8.5%. See The Year in Trade: Operation of
the Trade Agreements Program, 43rd Rep., USITC Pub. 2554 (Aug. 1992)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2554].
14 James M. DeVault, The Republic of Korea and the United
States:
Trade and Trade Policy Issues 9 (July 29-30, 1993) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the authors) (paper presented at the Conference on the U.S.Korea Economic Partnership, July 29-30, 1993 in Philadelphia, PA).
Five percent of the total Korean exports to the United States is $1
billion. For Korea's relatively small economy, this is a significant amount.
" Products that Korea allegedly dumped on the United States market
include automotive batteries, ball bearings, brass sheet and strip, cast-iron
pipe fittings, cold-rolled carbon steel, color picture tubes, computer chips,
flat-rolled carbon steel, industrial belts, motorcycle batteries, nitrocellulose,
offshore platform jackets and piles, photo albums, polyethylene
terephthalate film, sheet and strip, stainless steel butt weld pipe fittings,
steel pipes and tubes, sweaters, telephone systems and subassemblies,
tubular goods, and welded stainless steel pipes. Full citations to each of
these actions are given in Section 3.3., and a brief summary of each of these
actions is provided in the Appendix to this Article.
38
See IL SAKONG, KOREA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 125 (1993).
See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATES REPORT
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS: KOREA 1 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE].
8 See id.
37
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rates are much higher than the 5% average tariff rate imposed
by member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"). "
While many of Korea's trade reforms have been voluntary,
the United States has been successful in pressuring Korea to
liberalize its trade policy in several areas through section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows the United States to
retaliate against trading partners that unreasonably or
unjustifiably restrict U.S. exports.4" Section 301 was used
successfully to affect the trading of Korean products such as
beef, cigarbttes, and wine.4 '
Despite the reforms made by the Korean government and
the subsequent reduction in formal trade barriers, the United
States has protested recently that informal trade barriers have
allowed Korea to wage an "anti-import campaign." 2 The
Korean government insists that restrictions on "luxury" import
goods are designed to reduce excessive consumption and to
encourage saving.4 3
3.3. Antidumping Duty Investigations
In recent years, the United States has initiated numerous
antidumping actions against Korean companies and industries.
Antidumping actions have been initiated against those Korean
industries producing automotive batteries," ball bearings,4 5
" The OECD is an international organization founded in 1961 to
stimulate economic progress and world trade. It is currently composed of
24 developed countries such as the United States, Japan, Canada and
Western European countries.
" Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2441 (1974).
41 See I. M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 404-31 (2d ed. 1992).
41 See Yeomin Yoon, Korean Protectionism: An Opinion, MID-ATLANTIC
J. Bus., Apr. 1991, at 69.
41

USITC Pub. 2554, supra note 33, at 121-22.

4"See 12-Volt Lead-Acid Type Automotive Storage Batteries from the
Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1710, Inv. No. 731-TA-261 (June 1985)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 1710] (preliminary determination).
""See Ball Bearings, Mounted or Unmounted, and Parts Thereof, from
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico, the
People's Republic of China, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Taiwan,
Turkey and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 2374, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-307 and 731TA-498-511 (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2374] (preliminary
determinations finding that no material harm has resulted to the United
States
by the
from the
listed2014
nations).
Published
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brass sheet and strip,46 cast-iron pipe fittings,4" cold-rolled
carbon steel,4" color picture tubes,49 computer chips,5" flatrolled carbon steel,51 industrial belts,52 motorcycle
batteries," nitrocellulose,54 offshore platform jackets and
46

See Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from Brazil, Canada, and the
Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1930, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-269 and 731-TA-311,
312, and 315 (Dec. 1986) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 1930] (final
determination).
47 See Certain Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Brazil, the Republic of Korea,
and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1845, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-278 through 280 (May
1986) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 1845] (final determination).
4' See Certain Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from the Republic of
Korea, USITC Pub. 1634, Inv. No. 701-TA-218 (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter
USITC Pub. 1634] (final determination).
"' See Color Picture Tubes from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
and Singapore, USITC Pub. 2046, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-367 to 370 (Dec. 1987)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2046] (final determinati6n).
50 See DRAMs of One Megabit and Above from the Republic of Korea,
USITC Pub. 2519, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (June 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
2519] (preliminary determination); DRAMs of One Megabit and Above from
the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 2629, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (May 1993)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2629] (final determination).
5' See Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub.
2549, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 354 and 731-TA-573 to 620 (Aug. 1992)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2549) (preliminary determination); Certain FlatRolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom vol. I, USITC Pub. 2664, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 332, 334,
336-342, 344, 347-353 and 731-TA-573 to 579, 581-592, 594-597, 599-609,
612-619 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2664-I] (final determination);
Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom vol. II, USITC Pub. 2664, Inv. Nos. 701TA-319 to 332, 334, 336-342, 344, 347-353 and 731-TA-573 to 579, 581-592,
594-597, 599-609, 612-619 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2664-I]
(final determination).
"2See Industrial Belts from Israel, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. 2194, Inv.
Nos. 701-TA-293 and 731-TA-412 to 419 (May 1989) [hereinafter USITC
Pub. 2194] (final determination).
" See 12-Volt Motorcycle Batteries from the Republic of Korea, USITC
Pub. 2203, Inv. No. 731-TA-434 (July 1989) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2203]
(preliminary determination); see also 12-Volt Motorcycle Batteries from
Korea, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,927 (Dep't Comm. 1989) (initiating antidumping
investigation).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss2/3
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piles,5 5 photo albums,5 6 polyethylene terephthalate film,
sheet and strip,"7 stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings,"
steel pipes and tubes, 9 sweaters, 0 telephone systems and
subassemblies," tubular goods,"s and welded stainless steel

"See Industrial Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, the People's Republic
of China, the Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, West Germany, and
Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 2231, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-439 to 445 (Nov. 1989)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2231] (preliminary determination); Industrial
Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the
Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub.
2295, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-439 to 444 (June 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
2295] (final determination).
" See Offshore Platform Jackets and Piles from the Republic of Korea
and Japan, USITC Pub. 1708, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-248 and 731-TA-259 to 260
(June 1985) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 1708] (preliminary determination).
" See Photo Albums and Photo Album Filler Pages from Hong Kong and
the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1660, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-240 to 241 (Mar.
1985) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 1660] (preliminary determination).
"' See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Japan, the
Republic of Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2292, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-458 to
460 (June 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2292] (preliminary determination);
Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Japan and the
Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 2383, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-458 to 459 (May
1991) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2383] (final determination); see also
Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Japan and the
Republic of Korea, 55 Fed. Reg. 52,105 (Intl Trade Comm. 1990) (institution
of final antidumping investigations).
"6See Certain Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from Korea and
Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2534, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-563 to 564 (July 1992)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2534] (preliminary determination).
SS See Certain Circular, Welded, Non-Alloy Steel Pipes and Tubes from
Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, and Venezuela,
USITC Pub. 2454, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-311 and 731-TA-532 to 537 (Nov. 1991)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2454] (preliminary determination); Certain
Circular, Welded, Non-Alloy Steel Pipes and Tubes from Brazil, the Republic
of Korea, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 2564, Inv.
Nos. 731-TA-532 to 537 (Oct. 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2564] (final
determination).
",See Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong
Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2312, Inv. Nos. 731TA-448 to 450 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2312] (final
determination); Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers
from Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan: Views on Remand,
USITC Pub. 2577, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-448 to 450 (Nov. 1992) [hereinafter
USITC Pub. 2577] (final determination).
6 See Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies thereof from Korea,
USITC Pub. 2254, Inv. No. 731-TA-427 (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
2254] (final determination).
" See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Brazil, Korea, and Spain, USITC
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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pipes.63 A summary of each of these actions is contained in
the Appendix.
4. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW:
AN ILLUSTRATIVE LOOK AT KOREA

The implementation of the U.S. antidumping law is flawed.
First, the method of computing dumping duties is unduly
Second, the U.S.
biased against foreign manufacturers.
antidumping law does not adequately take into account the
fluctuations of international exchange rates in determining
whether dumping has occurred. Third, the process by which
the U.S. antidumping law treats goods for which there is no
domestic market in the exporter's country is often inconsistent.
4.1. ComputationalProblems: The Use of Average Prices
In essence, under U.S. law, the price of the goods in the
United States is compared to the price of the goods sold in the
exporter's home market ("foreign market price"). 4 If the
foreign market price exceeds the U.S. price, a dumping duty
equivalent to the difference between the two prices will be
applied.65 The problem lies in the manner by which U.S. law
determines the U.S. price and the foreign market price. The
Commerce Department uses average prices to set foreign
market price. A representative sample of individual U.S. sales
are then compared to this average foreign market price. If the
U.S. price is less than the foreign market price in any
individual case, dumping is determined to have occurred. 6
Pub. 1633, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-215 to 217 (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
1633] (final determination).
"3See Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipes from the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2474, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-540 to 541 (Jan. 1992)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2474] (preliminary determination); Certain Welded
Stainless Steel Pipes from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub.
2585, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-540 to 541 (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
2585] (final determination).
6
4 See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 679.
65 See id. at 678-79.
"6 See Tubular Steel Framed Chairs from Taiwan, 50 Fed. Reg. 21,917
(Intl Trade Admin. 1985) (final determination); Cellular Mobile Telephones
and Subassemblies from Japan, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,447 (Int'l Trade Admin.
1985) (final determination) (describing the calculation and comparison of
U.S. price and foreign market value).
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For example, in the Korean computer chip (DRAM) case,
the Commerce Department made one hundred comparisons
between the prices of Korean products and the prices of U.S.
products." The Commerce Department found that in fortyseven cases, the Korean company undersold the U.S. company
by a range of 0.1% to 28%. In forty-eight cases, the Korean
product had a higher price than the U.S. product by a range of
0.3% to 69.2%. In the remaining five cases, the prices of the
Korean product were identical to those of the U.S. products.6"
In nearly one-half of the cases, the price charged by the
Korean firm was actually more than that charged by the
domestic firm. This suggests that as to half of its products
there was no dumping. 9
The Commerce Department,
however, can impose a dumping margin if a foreign company
sells any units in the U.S. market at a price lower than the
average foreign price for the period being investigated.7 0
Therefore, if the foreign exporter charges a range of prices over
some relevant period of time, it may be that some of the prices
will be below the average foreign price and some will be above
the average foreign price. This means that some of the sales
could potentially be categorized as dumping.
Such an
approach is illogical and inherently unfair.7" Indeed, the
General Accounting Office has criticized the practice of using
the average price for these reasons as well as because this

67
68

See infra Appendix.
See USITC Pub. 2519, supra note 50, at A-50.

"The dissenting opinion in the final determination raised another point:
Although the underselling/overselling comparisons are almost
evenly split, we do not place much weight on evidence of
underselling. As discussed above, the confluence of demand for
memory and the point in the product life cycle largely explain the
price of DRAMs at any particular point in time. As a result of
market forces, price comparisons are only meaningful if they are
contemporaneous, i.e., at the same point in the DRAM product life
cycle. In this investigation, the price comparisons between
domestic DRAMs and subject imports are not contemporaneous.
Accordingly, the price comparisons do not constitute substantial
evidence that any underselling is significant.
USITC Pub. 2629, supra note 50, at 49.
70 See BOVARD, supra note 9, at 120-21.
71 Other commentators agree with this conclusion. See, e.g., Wesley K.
Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisionsof the Tariff Act of
1930,
13Law:
L. &
POL'Y
INTL Repository,
Bus. 693 2014
(1981).
Published
by Penn
Legal
Scholarship

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 15:2

practice increases existing dumping margins or creates new
ones. 72 The Court of International Trade has also criticized
this method of price comparison, stating that it "leads to loss
of reasonable fairness in the results."
This averaging
method produces a built-in bias against foreign producers. It
compares the average foreign price with the price at which
each sale is made in the United States. When sales are made
at a price above this "fair value," it treats such sales as if they
were made at fair value. Therefore, these sales are assigned
a less than fair value ("LTFV") amount of zero rather than a
negative value. Thus, when the Commerce Department
combines sales made at prices lower than fair value with those
made at prices higher than fair value, it invariably skews the
statistical result in favor of a higher dumping margin.7 In
some cases, this method calculates a dumping margin where
none exists.7 5
An alternative method for computing the dumping margin
is necessary. Using a negative number rather than zero when

72 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING

ACT OF 1921, Mar. 15, 1979, at 21, cited in BOVARD, supra note 9, at 122,'
163 n.59.
" See NAR, S.p.A. v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 553, 559 (Ct. Intl
Trade 1989).
71 See Knoll, supra note 5, at 278.
71 For example, assume that the average foreign price for a certain
product is $5.00 and the actual prices charged in the U.S. market for five
specific domestic sales are $6.00, $5.50, $5.00, $4.50, and $4.00. The less
than fair value ("LTFV") amounts would be computed as follows:
Average
Actual Sale
LTFV
Case No.
Foreign Price
Price in U.S.
Amount

1
2
3
4

$5.00
$5.00
$5.00
$5.00

$6.00
$5.50
$5.00
$4.50

$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.50

5
$5.00
$4.00
$1.00
In the first three cases, no dumping margins are found because the price
charged in the United States is higher or equal to the average price charged
in foreign markets. There is a dumping margin in the fourth and fifth
cases, however, because the U.S. price is less than the average foreign price.
Yet if one takes the average of the prices charged in the United States, it is
exactly the same as the average foreign price-$5.00. But the LTFV
amounts add up to a positive number, $1.50, because whenever the U.S.
price is higher than the average foreign price, the LTFV amount is assigned
a zero value, whereas whenever the U.S. price is lower than the average
foreign price, the LTFV amount is assigned a positive value.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss2/3

U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW

1994]

analyzing prices above fair value provides, overall, a more
accurate calculation of the dumping margin.
To illustrate, assume that a Korean firm sold ten units of
a product in Korea for $20 per unit on January 20. Assume
that it sold an equal number of units in the U.S. market on the
same day for the same price. On June 15, the same Korean
company sold ten more units in Korea for $10 per unit, and
ten units in the United States for the same price. The
weighted average foreign market price ("fair value") is
calculated to be $15 per unit."
According to the method
currently used by the Commerce Department, a LTFV of $0
and a LTFV of $5 should be assigned to the January and the
June sales, respectively. This results in a dumping margin of
16.67%."
This entire calculation is flawed on a number of counts. It
is questionable to compare the actual price charged for
particular U.S. sales to the average foreign price. Individual
foreign prices should be compared with individual U.S. prices,
or average foreign prices should be compared with average
U.S. prices. The correct way to compute the dumping margin
would be to assign a LTFV of minus $5, not $0, to the January
sale, thus resulting in a zero dumping margin.s
4.2. Shifts In Exchange Rates
In order to compare the foreign price with the domestic
price, the foreign price must be converted into dollars. As a
0

This number is derived as follows: $[20 (10 units) + $10 (10 units)]/
20 units = $15 weighted average foreign market price.
" The dumping margin is calculated with the following information:
Korean
U.S.
Average
LTFV
Case
Price
Price
Foreign Price
Amount
76

1/20

$20

$20

$15

$0

6/15
$10
$10
$15
$5
The dumping margin is computed as follows:
[$0 (10/20) +$5 (10/20)]/ $15 = $2.50/15 = 16.67%.
s The dumping margin is calculated with the following information:
Korean
U.S.
Average
LTFV
Case
Price
Price
Foreign Price
Amount
-$5
$15
T20
1/20
$20

6/15

$10

$10

The dumping margin is computed as follows:

$15

[-$5(10/20) + $5(10/20)]/$15 = $0/$15 = $0.00%.
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result, shifts in exchange rates can cause a company, through
no fault of its own, to be liable for dumping. Ever since the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, exchange rates have
been floating rather than fixed.7 s Currently, the way the
Commerce Department uses exchange rates creates cases of
dumping where none previously existed.8" For example, if
the British Pound is equal to $1.50 at the time the contract is
entered finto and the price of the product in question is £1 in
England and $1.50 in the United States, then there is no
dumping because the price is the same in both countries. But
if the exchange rate shifts so that £1 equals $1.75, then there
is dumping because the product sells in England for an
amount equivalent to $1.75, whereas the price in the United
States is $1.50. Consequently, even if there was no intent to
dump, a foreign exporter can still be found to have dumped if
the exchange rates shifted in the wrong direction. Exporters
that are based in countries that have hyperinflation can be
severely penalized by the Commerce Department's

7 When exchange rates were fixed, it was simpler to predict
future
exchange rates because they would be the same as current exchange rates.
But having .fixed, rather than flexible, exchange rates causes other
problems. For example, to prevent a run on (or toward) a particular
country's currency, central banks have to intervene by buying or selling the
target currency. One advantage of flexible exchange rates over fixed
exchange rates is that flexible rates provide a check on inflation. A country
that inflates its currency at a faster than average rate will have the value
(and the desirability) of its currency adversely affected in the international
marketplace because supply and demand will automatically shift to reflect
the currency's true relative value. Having fixed exchange rates, coupled
with central bank intervention, prevents this natural shift from taking
place, thus causing disruption and distortion throughout all the major
economies. For arguments in favor of flexible exchange rates, see MILTON

FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 157-203 (1953); MILTON
FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. ROOSA, THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: FREE VS. FIXED
EXCHANGE RATES (1967), reprinted in MILTON FRIEDMAN, DOLLARS AND
DEFICITS 218-34 (1968).

The Bretton Woods agreement-signed by 45 nations in Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire in July, 1944-established the International Monetary
Fund and resulted in a number of actions that exacerbated post-WWII
inflations. For a brief summary of the Bretton Woods Agreement, see
MURRAY ROTHBARD, THE MYSTERY OF BANKING 252-54 (1983). For a more

detailed description and analysis of its consequences, see HENRY HAZLITT,
FROM BRETTON WOODS TO WORLD INFLATION:
CONSEQUENCES (1984).

A STUDY OF CAUSES AND

"0See generally N. David Palmeter, Exchange Rates and Antidumping
Determinations,22 J. WORLD TRADE 73 (1988).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss2/3
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methodology81 because of frequent devaluation of their home
currency.
4.3. ComparingPricesIn DissimilarMarkets
When the allegedly dumped good is not sold in the
exporter's home market it can be difficult to determine the
foreign market price.
In such cases, the Commerce
Department compares the prices the foreign exporter charges
in the United States to those it charges in a third country.8 2
For example, several Korean sweater companies were
penalized because they sold their sweaters in the U.S. market
for slightly less than the price charged in other foreign
"markets."
The Commerce Department's investigation
determined that the price of the sweaters one Korean company
sold in the United States was 1.20% lower than the price of
the sweaters in Mexico. 4 The price another company
charged in the United States was 1.11% lower than the price
charged in Canada. 5 A third company sold its sweaters for
0.73% less in the United States than in the United
Kingdom.8" The Commerce Department found that
all of
7
these companies had violated U.S. antidumping law.
Several factors were ignored in the Commerce
Department's analysis. For example, each shipment of
sweaters was a custom order, and there were significant
differences in the actual sweaters the Korean companies
exported to the three different countries. The Commerce
Department, however, treated the sweaters as identical.
In light of this criticism, it is appropriate to consider what
standard the Commerce Department should have used in

s' Some commentators have suggested that the Commerce Department
should use a different methodology in cases involving a hyper-inflationary
currency. See Gilbert B. Kaplan et al., Cost Analysis Under the
Antidumping Law, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L.L. & ECON. 357, 409-10 (1988).
82

See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 679.

83 See USITC Pub. 2312, supra note 60, at B-33.
84

See id.

See id.
See id.
87 See BOVARD, supra note 9, at 121; see also USITC Pub. 2577, supra
note 60, cited in I. M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITIcS 396 (2d ed.
1992).
85

86
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arriving at the price of Korean sweaters. Certainly it should
have allowed for differences in quality and type, and in
addition, it should have considered each shipment as a custom
order.
5. USE OF THE ANTIDUMPING LAW

To HARASS FOREIGN COMPETITION
More antidumping penalties on low-priced imported goods
have been imposed in the United States than in any other
country.8 8 Under the U.S. rules, nearly all the foreign sellers
that were investigated for dumping between 1980 and 1989
were found liable.8"
Even if a company ultimately is
determined not to have dumped, the time and money involved
in settling the case can bankrupt a small or medium-size
company, and the expense would force even a large company
to think twice about exporting to the United States. As a
result, the U.S. antidumping law significantly chills foreign
competitors from exporting their goods to the United States at
all. For example, the Matshushita company withdrew from
one antidumping case that involved the investigation of small
business telephone systems-consequently abandoning more
than $50 million in export sales-because the Commerce
Department requested on a Friday afternoon that the
Company translate 3,000 pages of Japanese financial
documents into English by the following Monday morning.9 0
Another example suggests that at least one antidumping
investigation "effectively wrecked the exports of hundreds of
Taiwanese sweater companies because a few small Taiwanese
companies could not quickly respond to [the Commerce
Department's] massive information requests."9
The
Commerce Department required that the companies respond
to a 100-page English questionnaire and provide more than

88 U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., USE OF THE GATT ANTIDUMPING CODE 3-4
(1990), cited in BOVARD, supra note 9, at 107.
8' Only six of the Commerce Department investigations made between
1980 and 1986 resulted in those investigated being found not liable for
dumping. See Bovard, supra note 18, at F13.
For a summary of
antidumping investigations undertaken between 1979 and 1990 and their
outcomes, see DESTLER, supra note 87, at 326-403.
" See BOVARD, supra note 9, at 136.
91See BOVARD, supra note 9, at 139.
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200,000 pieces of information.9 " The management "team" of
one of these companies consisted of a business run solely by a
husband and his wife.9" The Commerce Department held
that lack of management was an inadequate justification for
failing to respond.14 Another company did not respond
because a fire destroyed all of its records. This too was
determined to be an insufficient reason for not responding to
the Department's inquiry.9 5 Because of the lack of response
from these companies, and other small Taiwanese
manufacturers, a 21.94% dumping duty was assessed on all
Taiwanese sweater manufacturers, which when combined with
a 34% tariff, makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for a
Taiwanese company to sell sweaters in the United States.9
Within a year after this investigation commenced, more than
two-thirds of the Taiwanese companies that manufacture
acrylic sweaters had gone out of business.
Domestic companies are aware of this situation, and often
use the antidumping law to harass or intimidate foreign
competitors. "8 This harassment is likely to occur whenever
the cost of filing a petition is lower than the potential benefits
to the petitioning company from an investigation.
The
government pays all of the costs of an antidumping
prosecution. Therefore, the domestic firm that initiates the
proceeding does not incur any cost, but stands to gain much if
a foreign competitor is either forced to raise its prices, or is
turned away from the U.S. market completely. Thus, by
initiating a proceeding, a domestic producer can reduce
competition from abroad and avoid lowering prices to meet a
foreign producer's prices.
6. THE HARMS OF ANTIDUMPING PROTECTIONISM
The U.S. antidumping law is unduly protectionist. As
numerous studies have indicated, the antidumping law

'

Id.

,3 Id

"Id.
'7

1

at 155.
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Although domestic

industry is certainly being protected by protectionist policies,
a study of 203 ITC investigations in five industries found that
protectionism was not effective in stimulating output in the
protected domestic industry because the reactions of
In
consumers tended to offset the actions of producers."
essence, if the protected industry raises the price of its
product, consumers will often shun the high-priced product
and buy a lower-priced substitute product instead. A study by
the Congressional Budget Office also reached this same

conclusion.'0 1
There are a number of general results associated with
protectionist antidumping policy. First, when the government
narrowly defines an industry so that it can show injury from
imports, users and foreign suppliers often shift to substitute
x2
items, which essentially circumvents the antidumping law.1
Second, when the United States adopts a temporary
protectionist measure in order to protect an "infant"
industry0 " or to provide breathing room'" for an ailing
8 We will discuss some of these studies infra.
100 See Robert E. Baldwin & Richard K. Green, The Effects of Protection
on Domestic Output, in TRADE POLICY ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 205,

223-24 (Robert E. Baldwin ed., 1988).
10' The Congressional Budget Office study concluded that "protection has
not substantially improved the ability of domestic firms to compete with
foreign producers." Congressional Budget Office, Has Trade Protection
Revitalized Domestic Industries? Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, at 96, quoted in Protectionism'sAdverse Economic Impact,
U.S. Intl Trade Comm. Inv. No. 332-325 (Oct 1992) (written testimony of
Daniel Oliver, former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission).
102 See Baldwin & Green, supra note 100, at 223-24.
103 The "infant" sugar industry has been protected by the U.S.
government since 1816. This protection has resulted in the domestic sugar
industry charging up to four times the world price for sugar. Restrictions
on sugar imports in 1987, for example, cost American consumers between
$2.1 and $3 billion. The high cost of sugar led to increases in the price of
corn sweeteners, which cost consumers an additional $1 billion a year.
Sugar became so expensive that Coke and Pepsi switched to high fructose
corn syrup, which caused U.S. sugar consumption to fall by more than
500,000 tons a year. Thus, the long-run effects of protection may actually
harm the protected industry more than it helps. See generally BOVARD,
supra note 9, at 71-72; Bruce L. Gardner, The United States, in
AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD 47 (Fred H.
Sanderson ed., 1990); Janet Novack, Three Yards and a Cloud of (Sugar)
Dust, FORBES, Sept. 4, 1989, at 39.
104 The breathing room argument has been used to provide "temporary"
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industry, problems arise because such temporary measures
tend to become permanent. Consequently, industries that are
relieved of the pressure of competition do not take advantage
of the opportunity to compete and often use their resources to
lobby the legislature to continue the protection rather than
invest in cost reduction. 10 5 In short, using the antidumping
law to protect domestic industry from Korean exporters may
result in domestic industries becoming uncompetitive.
Consumers must also bear the cost of the current U.S.
trade policy with Korea. Antidumping duties have led to a
reduction in consumer choice. If goods are prevented from
entering the United States because antidumping duties make
the product's price too high to be competitive, or because
quotas or the antidumping law prevents the goods from even
crossing the border, consumers may have to settle for their
second or third choice. This is economically inefficient. The
loss in utility is the difference between the utility consumers
would gain by purchasing their first choice product and the
utility they receive by settling for their second or third choice.
7. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the shortcomings of U.S.
antidumping policy using the Korean trade experience as a
case study.
Given the protectionist nature of U.S.
antidumping policy generally, which is compounded by
technical flaws in the existing U.S. statute-problems in
computing dumping margins, inadequate consideration of
fluctuating exchange rates, and inconsistent treatment of
goods not sold in the exporter's home market-the only proper
recourse is a serious and comprehensive reexamination, or

protection for a number of declining industries, such as automobiles, steel
and textiles. In the steel industry, for example, various government policies
have cushionedit from foreign competition at least since 1969 through quota
agreements and restrictions. Yet unit costs have risen and production has
fallen. Labor productivity actually declined after the passage of temporary
protectionist measures and cost-cutting has not been implemented.
Investment in the steel industry actually declined after the government
imposed import restrictions.
See WAYNE GABLE, MYTHs ABOUT
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 14 (n.d.).
06

Aaron Tornell, On the Ineffectiveness ofMade-to-MeasureProtectionist

Programs, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 76 (Elhanan

Helpman
& Assaf
Razin eds.,
1991).2014
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even outright repeal, of the U.S. antidumping statute.
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APPENDIX'

Summarik3d below are twenty antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations that have been conducted
against Korean companies and industries in the last decade.
1. AUTOMOTIVE BATTERIES'

07

An investigation began on May 8, 1985 by General Battery
International Corporation of Puerto Rico l ' to determine
whether certain 12-volt lead-acid type automotive storage
batteries from Korea were being sold, or were likely to be sold,
in the United States market at less than fair value. 10 9 The
ITC unanimously determined that "there [was] no reasonable
indication that an industry in the United States [was]
materially injured; or threatened with material injury; or that
the establishment of an industry in the United States was
retarded by reason of imports from the Republic of
materially
0
Korea.""

106 Citations to each footnote are given in full in the Appendix for the
reader's convenience, although they are also cited in footnotes 44-63 in the
body of the Article. Subsequent citations to sources in the Appendix will
refer to the citation given in the Appendix, not to citations given in the body
of the Article.
107 12-Volt Lead-Acid Type Automotive Storage Batteries from the
Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1710, Inv. No. 731-TA-261 (June 1985)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 1710] (preliminary determination).
'as 12-Volt Lead-Acid Type Automotive Storage Batteries from Korea, 50
Fed. Reg. 20,302 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (institution of preliminary
antidumping investigation).
10 12-Volt Lead-Acid Type Automotive Storage Batteries from Korea, 50
Fed. Reg. 23,486 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (initiation of antidumping duty
investigation).
110 USITC Pub. 1710, supra note 107, at 1.
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2. BALL BEARINGS""
This investigation was instigated as a result of a petition
filed by the Torrington Company of Torrington, Connecticut on
February 13, 1991 to determine whether Korean ball
bearing"' imports were being sold in the United States for
less than fair value. 3 The Torrington Company alleged
that the Korean dumping margins ranged between 7.41% and
149.78%.1
The ITC determined that there. was no
reasonable indication of dumping. 5

3. BRASS SHEET AND STRIP 1 6
This investigation was initiated as the result of a petition
filed March 10, 1986 by American Brass, Bridgeport Brass
Company, Chase Brass and Copper Company, Hussey Metals
Division, the Miller Company, Olin Corporation-Brass Group,
and Revere Copper Products, Inc., all domestic manufacturers
of brass sheet and strip, and by three unions:
the
International Union-Allied Industrial Workers of America

...
Ball Bearings, Mounted or Unmounted, and Parts Thereof, from
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico, the
People's Republic of China, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Taiwan,
Turkey and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 2374, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-307 and 731TA-498-511 (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2374] (preliminary
determination) (finding that no material harm has resulted to the United
States by the imports from the listed nations).
11 The products covered by this investigation included all ground antifriction bearings and parts thereof, finished or unfinished, which employ
balls as the rolling element, whether or not housed or combined. Id. at 1,
n.3.
113 Ball Bearings, Mounted or Unmounted, and Parts Thereof, from
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico, the
People's Republic of China, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Taiwan,
Turkey, and Yugoslavia, 56 Fed. Reg. 7,398 (U.S. Intl Trade Comm. 1991)
(institution of preliminary countervailing duty and antidumping
investigations); see also Ball Bearings, Mounted or Unmounted, and Parts
Thereof, from Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Mexico, the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Republic of Korea,
Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, 56 Fed. Reg. 10,237 (Dep't Comm.
1991) (initiation of antidumping duty investigation).
114 56 Fed. Reg., supra note 113, at 10,238.
115 USITC Pub. 2374, supra note 111, at 2.
11 Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from Brazil, Canada, and the Republic
of Korea, USITC Pub. 1930, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-269 and 731-TA-311, 312, and
315 (Dec. 1986) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 1930] (final determination).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss2/3
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(AFL-CIO); Mechanics Educational Society of America (Local
56); and United Steelworkers of America (AFL/CIO-CLC). The
petition was filed on behalf of the domestic industry in the
United States that casts, rolls and finishes brass sheet and
strip."7 The ITC found that brass sheet and strip from
Korea were being, or were likely to be, sold in the United
States at less than fair value, and found the weighted-average
dumping margin to be 7.17%.118
In arriving at this
determination, the ITC made fair value comparisons based on
sales of the class or kind of merchandise shipped to the United
States"' for the period October 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986,
the period of investigation. 20
12
4. CAST-IRON PIPE FITTINGS 1

This investigation began from petitions fied July 31, 1985
by the Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings Committee, which is composed
of Stanley G. Flagg & Co., Inc., ITT-Grinnell Corp., Stockham
Valves & Fittings Co., U-Brand Corp., and Ward Foundry
Division of Clevepak Corp. 22 The petitions charged that
Korean companies were selling their malleable cast-iron pipe
fittings in the United States at less than fair value. The
preliminary investigation found a reasonable indication that
an industry in the United States was materially injured due
to the importation of the merchandise in question. 121 The
ITC's final determination found dumping margins ranging
from less than 1%to 93.42% percent, with a weighted-average

Brass Sheet and Strip from the Republic of Korea, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,833
(Dep't Comm. 1986) (final determination of sales at less than fair value).
117

Ila I&
Only one firm responded to requests for information.
120 51 Fed. Reg., supra note 117, at 40,833. The Commerce Department
justified using the trade figures for only one company (Poongsan) because
the imports from this company represented more than 97 percent of the
total Korean imports. Id at 40,834-35.
121 Certain Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Brazil, the Republic of Korea,
and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1845, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-278 through 280 (May
1986) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 1845] (final determination).
122 Certain Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Brazil, Korea and Taiwan, 51
Fed. Reg. 4660, n.2 (U.S. Intl Trade Comm. 1986) (institution of final
antidumping investigations). U-Brand Corp. did not join the other
committee
members in filing petitions. Id. at n.2.
12 3

Id. at 4660.
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margin of 12.48%.12
5.

COLD-ROLLED CARBON STEEL

1 25

This countervailing duty investigation followed a petition
filed on June 18, 1984 by the United States Steel Corporation
on behalf of the carbon steel structural shapes and cold-rolled
carbon steel flat-rolled products (shapes and sheet)
industries. 2"
The petition charged that certain benefits,
which constituted subsidies within the meaning of the
countervailing duty laws, were being provided to
manufacturers, producers or exporters in Korea of (1) coldrolled carbon steel flat-rolled products and (2) carbon steel
structural shapes. The ITC found a 3.6% subsidy to exist for
the first category of products. The subsidy for the second
category of product was 0.37%, which was held to be de
minimis, and therefore not subject to a penalty. 27 According
to the ITC, the following Korean programs were conferring
subsidies:
" Short-term export financing under the export
financing regulations; 2
" Tax incentives for exporters;12
* Special depreciation; 30
" Government equity infusions;'3 1
" Reductions in port charges; 3 2
* Tariff reductions on plants and equipment 3 3

124 Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings, Other than Grooved, from Korea,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,900-901 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (final determination of sales at
less than fair value).
125 Certain Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from the Republic of
Korea, USITC Pub. 1634, Inv. No. 701-TA-218 (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter
USITC Pub. 1634] (final determination).
12' Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Korea and Carbon
Steel Structural Shapes from Korea, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,284 (Dep't Comm.
1984)
(final determination).
2
1 7 Ida

Id. at
at
130 Id. at
131 Id. at
129

129 1&.

132
133

47,286-87.

47,287.

47,287-88.

47,288.

Id,
Id,
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Interestingly enough, the same government assistance in
foreign nations labelled as subsidies under U.S. countervailing
duty laws are not much different from the types of domestic
assistance given by the past few administrations to help U.S.
companies and industries compete in international markets.
6. COLOR PICTURE TUBES'"
This investigation was initiated on November 26, 1986 by
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers; the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers;
the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Technical,
Salaried & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC; the United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO; and the Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO.' 3 5 These unions represent four of the
five producers of color picture tubes 3 ' in the United
States.'3 7 The ITC determined that imports from Korea
were being sold in the United States market for 1.91% less

than fair value. 8'
7. COMPUTER CHIPS 3 9
This investigation was instigated by Micron Technology,
Inc. of Boise, Idaho in April 1992.40 The petition requested
13 Color Picture Tubes from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
Singapore, USITC Pub. 2046, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-367 to 370 (Dec. 1987)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2046] (final determination).
13 Color Picture Tubes from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
Singapore, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,353, 28,354 (U.S. Intl Trade Comm. 1987)
[hereinafter Color Picture Tubes (final investigation)] (final investigation).
136 Color picture tubes are defined as "cathode ray tubes suitable for use
in the manufacture of color television receivers or other color entertainment
display devices intended for television viewing." Color Picture Tubes from
Korea, 52 Fed. Reg. 44,186, 44,186 (Dep't Comm. 1987) [hereinafter Color
Picture Tubes] (final determination).
13 Color Picture Tubes (final investigation), supra note 135, at 28,354.
'
Color Picture Tubes, supra note 136 at 44,190.
13 DRAMs of One Megabit and Above from the Republic of Korea, USITC
Pub. 2519, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (June 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2519]
(preliminary determination); DRAMs of One Megabit and Above from the
Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 2629, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (May 1993)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2629] (final determination).
14 Dynamic Random Access Memories of One Megabit and Above from
the Republic of Korea, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,163 (U.S. Intl Trade Comm. 1992)
(preliminary
Published
by Penn Law:investigation).
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the investigation of Goldstar Electron Co., Hyundai Electronic
Industries and Samsung Electronics Co. for selling dynamic
random access memory semiconductors of one megabit and
above (DRAMs) 4 ' for less than the cost of production.'"
The range of dumping margins assessed, based on a
comparison of U.S. prices to constructed value alleged by
Micron, was for Hyundai: 94.29% - 170.89% (one meg) and
278.83% - 282.5 1% (four meg); for Goldstar: 132.11% - 165.29%

(one meg) and 273.25% (four meg); for Samsung: 0.62% - 3.83%
(one meg) and 93.18% - 97.39% (four meg).'
In arriving at
these dumping margins, 100 price comparisons were made
between U.S. prices and Korean prices. In forty-seven cases,
the Korean price was lower than the U.S. price ranging
between 0.1% and 28%. In forty-eight cases, the Korean price
was higher than the domestic product price ranging from
between 0.3% and 69.2%. In five cases, the prices of the two
products were identical.'" In its
final investigation, the ITC
1 45
found no evidence of dumping.

141 The items covered by this petition included processed wafers, uncut
die, cut die, and assembled 1 Meg and above DRAMs produced in Korea and
imported directly or indirectly into the United States; processed wafers
produced in Korea and further processed into finished or semi-finished 1
Meg and above DRAMs in a third country before exportation to the United
States; finished or semi-finished DRAMs assembled in Korea from wafers
produced in another country; memory modules, such as Single In-Line
Processing Modules (SIPs) and Single In-Line Memory Modules (SIMMs),
containing more than one 1-Meg or above DRAMs mounted on their own
small printed circuit board, as well as memory cards, which are memory
modules about the size of a credit card which are designed to be easily
inserted into portable computers, printers, and similar applications; socalled video random access memory (VRAM) which is DRAM designed to
improve the video performance of computers; and any future packaging and
assembling of DRAMs. Id at 18,163.
142 Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of one Megabit and
Above from the Republic of Korea, 57 Fed. Reg., 21,231 (Dep't Comm. 1992)
(initiation
of investigation).
14
3

ld

1" USITC Pub. 2519, supra note 139, at A-50.
14 USITC Pub. 2629 supra note 139, at 65.
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1 46
FLAT-ROLLED CARBON STEEL

This investigation was initiated by Armco Steel Co., L.P.;
Bethlehem Steel Corp.; Geneva Steel; Gulf States Steel, Inc. of
Alabama; Inland Steel Industries, Inc.; Laclede Steel Co., Inc.;
Lukens Steel Co.; National Steel Corp.; Sharon Steel Corp.;
USX Corp./U.S. Steel Group; and WCI Steel, Inc. 1 47 against
several steel companies in Korea 14 ' and steel companies in
more than a dozen other countries for alleged countervailing
duty and antidumping violations. 4 9 In Korea's case, items
under the antidumping investigation involved certain hotrolled carbon steel flat products; certain cold-rolled carbon
steel flat products; certain'corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat
products; and certain cut-to-length carbon steel plate. 5 '
The countervailing duty investigation involved certain equity
infusions into POSCO (one of the Korean companies accused
of being subsidized) in 1981, and from 1986 to 1988. In

140 Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia,

Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub.
2549, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 354 (Aug. 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
2549] (preliminary determination); Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel
Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom vol. I, USITC Pub. 2664, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 332, 334,
336-342, 344, 347-353, 731-TA-573 to 579, 581-592, 594-597, 599-609, 612619 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2664-I] (final determination);
Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom vol. II, USITC Pub. 2664,
Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 332, 334, 336-342, 344, 347-353, 731-TA-573 to 579,
581-592, 594-597, 599-609, 612-619 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
2664-II] (final determination).
'4 Not all of these companies were petitioners in each case.
" The companies being sued are named in USITC Pub. 2549, supranote
146, at 1-99.
149 Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,231 (U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm. 1992) (preliminary investigation).
1 0 Certain Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain,
Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,971 (Dep't
Comm. 1992) (preliminary investigation).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 15:2

addition, the investigation resulted in government land
transfers to POSCO for the Pohang facility (one of POSCO's
plant facilities).151 In the case of the Korean companies,
alleged dumping margins at the preliminary investigation
ranged from 5.53% to 152.84%.152 The subsidy rate was
alleged to be 11.74%."'l
This barrage of investigations virtually closed portions of
the U.S. steel market to certain kinds of foreign steel for a
significant period of time." This put a number of U.S. steel
producers in the awkward position of having to increase the
amount of semi-finished steel they imported in order to fill
their own orders for finished steel.'55 The ITC's final ruling
stated that steel imports did not injure the U.S. industry in
over half of the seventy-four cases that were investigated. 5 '
As a result of this ruling, steel prices are expected to drop.'
9. INDUSTRIAL BELTS 5 "
This investigation resulted from the petition filed on June
30, 1988 by the Gates Rubber Company of Denver,
Colorado. 5 ' The petitioner alleged that Korean industrial
151 Id.
151 Richard

K. Bank, Trade Horizons, KOREA BUS. WORLD, Aug. 1992, at

12.
153

1d

Experts say that foreign steel is effectively barred from the U.S.
market when dumping duties exceed 15%. James Bovard, Steel Rulings
Dump on America, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1993, at A14.
1" Dana Milbank, U.S. Steel Industry'sNew Strength May Soon Weaken,
WALL ST. J., June 3, 1993, at B4. Milbank points out that these suits may
actually damage the steel industry in the United States because the
breathing room provided by the suits allowed inefficient capacity to remain,
while encouraging the growth of mini mills and making the domestic steel
industry more isolated and parochial. Id.
5
Asra Q. Nomani & Dana Milbank, Trade Panel Backs Foreign Steel
Concerns, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1993, at A3; see also USITC Pub. 2664-1,
supra note 146.
157 Erle Norton & Dana Milbank, ITC Stance Puts Pressure on Steel
Prices and Eases Concerns About Inflation, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1993, at
A2.
15 Industrial Belts from Israel, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. 2194, Inv.
Nos. 701-TA-293 and 731-TA-412 to 419 (May 1989) [hereinafter USITC
Pub. 2194] (final determination).
159 Industrial Belts from Israel et al., 54 Fed. Reg. 6970-6971 (U.S. Int'l
154
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belts.60 were being sold in the United States for less than
fair value. The ITC determined that the Korean industrial
belts were indeed being sold, or were likely to be sold, in the
United States for less than fair value, 6 ' and estimated the
average of the highest margin to be 64.3%."62 The ITC,
however, determined that the countervailing duty laws were
not violated; and the estimated net subsidy of 0.41% was held
to be de minimis. 6 3

10. MOTORCYCLE BATTERIES'"
This investigation commenced on May 17, 1989 in response
to a petition filed by Yuasa-Exide Battery Corp. of Reading,
Pennsylvania to determine whether an industry in the United
States was materially injured, or was threatened with material
injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United
States was materially retarded by 12-volt motorcycle batteries
imported from Korea.'65 The target of the investigation was
Korea Storage Battery Co., Ltd.166 The ITC unanimously
found that the charges were groundless. 6 7

Trade Comm. 1989) (final investigation).
1. The industrial belts in this investigation consisted of belting and belts
for machinery, in part or wholly of rubber or plastics. Excluded from this
investigation were imports of conveyor belts and automotive belts.
Industrial Belts from Israel and South Korea, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,517 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm. 1988) (final investigation).
161 Industrial Belts and Components and Parts Thereof, Whether Cured
or Uncured, from the Republic of Korea, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,487, 15,487 (Dep't
1989) (final determination).
Comm.
16
Id at 15,489.
163 Industrial Belts and Components and Parts Thereof, Whether Cured
or Uncured, from the Republic of Korea, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,513 (Dep't Comm.
1989) (final negative countervailing duty determination).
164 12-Volt Motorcycle Batteries from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub.
2203, Inv. No. 731-TA-434 (July 1989) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2203]
(preliminary determination); see also 12-Volt Motorcycle Batteries from
Korea, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,927 (Dep't Comm. 1989) (initiating investigation).
'" 12-Volt Motorcycle Batteries from the Republic of Korea, 54 Fed. Reg.
23,296, 23,296-297 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm. 1989) (preliminary
investigation).
166 12-Volt Motorcycle Batteries from Korea, 54 Fed. Reg., supra note
164, at 24,928.
1"

USITC Pub. 2203, supra note 164, at 3.
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11. NITROCELLULOSE' 6 8

This investigation began as the result of a petition filed on
September 19, 1989 by Hercules, Inc. of Wilmington,
Delaware. 6 '
The petitioner alleged that imports of
industrial nitrocellulose from Korea were being, or were likely
to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value. 7 °
The ITC determined that there was a reasonable indication
that an industry in the United States was materially injured
as a result of these imports.' 7 ' It determined the weightedaverage dumping margins to be 66.0%.172
12. OFFSHORE PLATFORM JACKETS AND PILES..
This investigation was initiated by Kaiser Aluminum
Corporation and the Iiternational Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and
Helpers in April, 1985.''
A countervailing duty
investigation was brought against Korean manufacturers,
producers and exporters of offshore platform jackets and piles
for receiving benefits that constitute subsidies. 5 The ITC
Industrial Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, the People's Republic of
China, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and
Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 2231, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-439 to 445 (Nov. 1989)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2231] (preliminary determination); Industrial
Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the
Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub.
2295, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-439 to 444 (June 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
2295] (final determination).
168 Industrial Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, the-People's Republic of
China, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and
Yugoslavia, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,055 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm. 1989) (institution
of investigation).
170 Industrial Nitrocellulose from the Republic of Korea, 54 Fed. Reg.
42,537, 42,537 (Dep't Comm. 1989) (initiation of antidumping duty
investigation).
USITC Pub. 2231, supra note 168, at 1.
172 Industrial Nitrocellulose from the Republic of Korea, 55 Fed. Reg.
21,054, 21,056 (Dep't Comm. 1990) (final determination).
173 Offshore Platform Jackets and Piles from the Republic of Korea and
Japan, USITC Pub. 1708, Inv. No. 701-TA-248 (June 1985) [hereinafter
USITC Pub. 1708] (preliminary determination).
174 Offshore Platform Jackets and Piles from the Republic of Korea, 50
Fed. Reg. 20,253, 20,253 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (initiation of countervailing
duty investigation).
175 Id at 20,253-54.
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determined that industries in the United States were
materially injured by Korean imports."'
13. PHOTO ALBUMS

77

This investigation was instigated in January, 1985 by
Esselte Pendaflex, Inc., The Holson Co., Kleer-Vu Plastics
Corp. and SPM Manufacturing on behalf of the U.S. photo
albums and photo album filler pages industry. 7 s The
investigation was brought against Korean manufacturers for
allegedly selling their products in the United States for less
than fair value. Preliminary dumping margins ranged from
26% to 83%.
14.
STRIP

POLYETHYLENE

179

TEREPHTHALATE

FILM,

SHEET

AND

This investigation was initiated in response to a petition
filed on April 27, 1990 by E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
Wilmington, Delaware; Hoechst Celanese Corp., Charlotte,
North Carolina; and ICI Americas, Inc., Wilmington,
Delaware. These companies alleged that Korean imports of
PET film, sheet and strip were being sold in the United States
at less than fair value.8 0 The ITC determined that an
See Offshore Platform Jackets and Piles from the Republic of Korea
and Japan, USITC Pub. 1848, Inv. No. 701-TA-248 (May 1986) (final
determination).
177 Photo Albums and Photo Album Filler Pages from Hong Kong and the
Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1660, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-240 and 241 (Mar.
1985) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 1660] (preliminary determination).
.7.Photo Albums and Photo Album Filler Pages from Hong Kong and the
Republic of Korea, 50 Fed. Reg. 5,327, 5,327-28 (U.S. Intl Trade Comm.
1985) (institution of preliminary antidumping investigation).
17 See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Japan,
the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2292, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-458
to 460 (June 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2292] (preliminary
determination); Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from
Japan and the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 2383, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-458
to 459 (May 1991) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2383] (final determination); see
also Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Japan and the
Republic of Korea, 55 Fed. Reg. 52,105 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm. 1990)
(giving notice of the final antidumping investigations to determine harm to
U.S. markets).
180 Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Japan and
the
Korea,
55 Fed.
Reg., 2014
supra note 179, at 52,105.
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industry in the United States was materially injured as a
result of the Korean imports81 ' and computed the weightedaverage dumping margins to be between 3.88% and 5.38%. 82
15. STAINLESS STEEL BUTT-WELD PIPE FITTINGS'

s3

This investigation began as the result of a petition filed on
May 20, 1992 by the Flowline Division of Markovitz
Enterprises, Inc. of New Castle, Pennsylvania."
The
petitioner alleged that certain stainless steel butt-weld pipe
fittings from Korea and Taiwan were being, or were likely to
be, sold in the United States for less than fair value.' 8 5 The
ITC determined unanimously that there was a reasonable
indication that an industry in the United States was
materially injured by reason of imports from Korea. 8 '
8 7
16. STEEL PIPES AND TUBES1

This investigation was instituted on September 24, 1991 by
counsel for Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., Harvey, Illinois;
American Tube Co., Phoenix, Arizona; Bull Moose Tube Co.,
.81USITC Pub. 2383, supra note 179, at 1.
182 Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from the Republic
of Korea, 56 Fed. Reg. 16,305, 16,317 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (final
determination of sales at less than fair value).
18 Certain Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from Korea and
Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2534, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-563 and 564 (July 1992)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2534] (preliminary determination).
18 Certain Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from the Republic of
Korea and Taiwan, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,486, 22,487 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm.
1992) (institution and scheduling
of preliminary
antidumping
investigations).
.. Certain Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from the Republic of
Korea and Taiwan, 57 Fed. Reg. 26,645, 26,645 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm.
1992) (initiation of antidumping duty investigations). The products subject
to these investigations were stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings, whether
finished or unfinished, under 14 inches inside diameter. Id.
186 USITC Pub. 2534, supra note 183, at 3.
187 Certain Circular, Welded, Non-Alloy Steel Pipes and Tubes from
Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, and Venezuela,
USITC Pub. 2454, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-311 and 731-TA-532 to 537 (Nov. 1991)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2454] (preliminary determination); Certain
Circular, Welded, Non-Alloy Steel Pipes and Tubes from Brazil, the Republic
of Korea, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 2564, Inv.
Nos. 731-TA-532 to 537 (Oct. 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2564] (final
determination).
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Gerald, Missouri; Century Tube Corp., Pine Bluff, Arkansas;
Sawhill Tubular Division of Cyclops Corp., Sharon,
Pennsylvania; Laclede Steel Co., St. Louis, Missouri; Maruichi
American Corp., Santa Fe Springs, California; Sharon Tube
Co., Sharon, Pennsylvania; Western Tube & Conduit Corp.,
Long Beach, California; and Wheatland Tube Co.,
Collingswood, New Jersey.'
The petition alleged that
circular welded non-alloy steel pipe 89 from Korea and other
countries was being, or was likely to be, sold in the United
States for less than fair value."' The petitioners estimated
the United States price based on two methods: (1) export price
quotes obtained from two Korean producers of standard pipe,
and (2) the customs value of standard pipe imported into the
United States from Korea during the second quarter of 1991.
The petitioners estimated fair value based on actual
transaction prices for welded standard pipe in Korea as
reported in the Korean publication COMPREHENSIVE
COMMODITY PRICE INFORMATION (June, 1991), which listed the

average FOB (freight on board) transaction price for standard
pipe during May, 1991. Based on these comparisons, they
alleged antidumping margins ranging from 1.81% to
25.04%."'l The ITC found that there was a reasonable
indication of material injury resulting from Korean imports
that were sold at less than fair value,'92 and assessed
dumping margins ranging from 4.91% to 11.63%."' In 25 of

Certain Circular, Welded, Non-Alloy Steel Pipes and Tubes from
Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, and Venezuela, 56
Fed. Reg. 49,903, 49,904 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm. 1991) (institution and
scheduling of preliminary countervailing duty and antidumping
investigations).
"" The circular welded non-alloy steel pipe covered in this investigation
18

included certain circular, welded, non-alloy steel pipes and tubes or circular

cross section, regardless of wall thickness not more than 406.4 mm (16
inches) in outside diameter. Id- at 49,904 n.2.
1.0 Certain Circular, Welded, Non-Alloy Steel Pipes and Tubes from
Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, and Venezuela, 56
Fed. Reg. 52,528, 52,528 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (initiation of antidumping
investigations).

191 Id.

USITC Pub. 2454, supra note 187, at 27.
Circular Welded, Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from the Republic of Korea, 57
Fed. Reg. 42,942, 42,953 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (final determination of sales
at less than fair value).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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55 possible quarterly price comparisons, the Korean companies
sold pipe at prices that were between 0.3% and 19.5% less
than those of domestic products. In the other 30 cases, the
Korean companies sold their pipe at higher than domestic
prices, at margins ranging from 0.6% to 1 5 .3 %."M
It should be noted that this was not the first investigation
involving circular, welded, non-alloy steel pipes and tubes.
The ITC previously conducted ten antidumping investigations
and six countervailing duty investigations involving these
products. Many of these investigations were terminated before
final antidumping and/or countervailing-duty orders were
issued. Some orders were revoked after the subject country
entered into a voluntary restraint arrangement with the
United States. 195

17. SWEATERS' 96
This investigation was initiated by a petition filed on
September 22, 1989 by counsel on behalf of the National
197
Knitwear and Sportswear Association, New York, New York.
The petitioner alleged that Korean sweaters made of manmade fiber were, or were likely to be, sold in the United States
for less than fair value.' 9 8 The ITC determined the weightedaverage dumping margins to be between 0.73% and 3.17%. 99
The ITC's holding that an industry in the United States was
materially injured was appealed to the Court of International
Trade,
which remanded the matter for further

194

USITC Pub. 2454, supra note 187, at A-52.

'"5 Id. at A-4.
1' Sweaters Wholly

or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong
Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2312, Inv. Nos. 731TA-448 to 450 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2312] (final
determination); Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers
from Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan: Views on Remand,
USITC Pub. 2577, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-448 to 450 (Nov. 1992) [hereinafter
USITC Pub. 2577] (final determination).
19 Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong
Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, 55 Fed. Reg. 19,369, 19,370 (U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm. 1990) (institution of final antidumping investigations).
196 Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong
Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, 55 Fed. Reg. 32,659, 32,659 (Dep't
Comm. 1990) (final determination of sales at less than fair value).
199 See id. at 32,672.
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determinations. 2" Upon remand, the ITC determined that
no industry in the United States was materially injured, or
threatened with material injury, by reason of the imported
Korean sweaters.201
18. TELEPHONE SYSTEMS AND SUBASSEMBLIES 0 2

This investigation responded to a petition filed on
December 28, 1988 by American Telephone & Telegraph Co. of
Parsippany, New Jersey and Comdial Corp. of Charlottesville,
Virginia. It alleged that certain telephone systems and
subassemblies" 3 were being sold in the United States for
less than fair value.Y2 4 The ITC's preliminary determination
found that there was a reasonable indication that an industry
in the United States was materially injured by reason of
imports.2"' The ITC's final determination found dumping
margins ranging from 13.4% to 14.75%.2o6

20 Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong
Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,352, 47,352 (U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm. 1992) (notice and scheduling of remand proceedings).
201 USITC Pub. 2577, supra note 196, at 1.
202 Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies thereof from Korea,

USITC Pub. 2254, Inv. No. 731-TA-427 (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
2254] (final determination).
203 For purposes of this investigation, "small business telephone systems
and subassemblies thereof' consisted of telephone systems, whether
complete or incomplete, assembled or unassembled, with intercom or
internal calling capability and total non-blocking ports capacities of between
2 and 256 ports, and discrete subassemblies thereof designed for use in such
systems. A subassembly is designed for use in small business systems if it
functions to its full capability only when operated as part of a small
business telephone system. These subassemblies consist of control and
switching equipment, circuit cards and modules and telephone sets and
consoles. See Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies thereof from
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,783, 33,783 n.1
(U.S. Intl Trade Comm. 1989) (institution of final antidumping
investigations).
204 See id. at 33,784.
205 See id.
206 USITC Pub. 2254, supra note 202, at B-3 to 4.
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19. TUBULAR GOODS 2°"

This investigation was instigated by Lone Star Steel
Company of Dallas, Texas, CF&I Steel Corporation of Pueblo,
Colorado; LTV Steel Company of Cleveland, Ohio; and the
United States Steel Corporation of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
in June, 1984.208 The investigation was brought against five
Korean producers 2 9 of oil country tubular goods 10 and five
Korean trading companies21 that exported the goods to the
United States as well as to companies located in Brazil and
Spain. The petitioners alleged that these companies received
export subsidies from the governments of Korea, Brazil21 2
and Spain. 1 s The investigation found the Brazilian and
Spanish companies to be guilty, but did not find the Korean
companies guilty of any violations.2 "4

207 Oil Country Tubular Goods from Brazil, Korea, and Spain, USITC
Pub. 1633, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-215 to 217 (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
1633] (final determination).
208 Oil Tubular Goods from the Republic of Korea, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,776,
46,776 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm. 1984) (final affirmative countervailing duty
determination).
209 The five Korean companies were Hyundai Pipe Company, Korea Steel
Pipe Company, Pusan Steel Pipe Company, Dongjin Steel Company and
Union Steel Manufacturing Company. Id. at 46,777.
210 Oil country tubular goods include hollow steel products of circular
cross-section intended for use in the drilling of oil or gas. These products
include oil well casing, tubing, and drill pipe of carbon or alloy steel,
whether welded or seamless, manufactured to either American Petroleum
Institute or proprietary specifications. Id. at 46,776.
211 The five Korean trading companies were the Hyundai Corporation,
Kukje-ICC Corporation, Sunkyong Limited, Samsung Co. Ltd. and Daewoo
Corporation. Id. at 46,777.
212 For a discussion on the countervailing duty case against the Brazilian
companies, see Oil Country Tubular Goods from Brazil, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,570
(Dep't Comm. 1984) (final affirmative countervailing duty determination).
213 For a discussion of the countervailing duty case against the Spanish
companies, see Oil Country Tubular Goods from Spain, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,060
(Dep't Comm. 1984) (final affirmative countervailing duty determination).
214 USITC Pub. 1633, supra note 207, at 1. The Brazilian and Spanish
companies were found guilty of materially injuring an industry in the
United States by reason of their imports, pursuant to § 705(b) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss2/3
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20. WELDED STAINLESS STEEL PIPES

This investigation was initiated by a petition filed
November 18, 1991 by Avesta Sandvik Tube, Inc., Bristol
Metals, Damascus Tubular Products, Trent Tube Division of
Crucible Materials Corp., and the United Steelworkers of
America."' The petition alleged that welded ASTM A-312
austenitic stainless steel pipe was being, or was likely to be,
sold in the United States at less than fair value.2"' The ITC
found the Korean companies guilty2 " of dumping at margins
of up to 30% in its preliminary investigation.21 " The final
investigation also found the Korean companies guilty of
dumping2 20 and assigned weighted-average dumping margins
of between 2.55% and 7.75%.221

215 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipes from the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2474, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-540 to 541 (Jan. 1992)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2474] (preliminary determination); Certain Welded
Stainless Steel Pipes from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub.
2585, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-540 to 541 (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
2585] (final determination).
216 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipes from the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan, 56 Fed. Reg. 59,961, 59,961 (U.S. Intl Trade Comm. 1991)
(institution and scheduling of preliminary antidumping investigations).
21 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipes from the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,043, 65,043 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (initiation of
antidumping investigations).
218 USITC Pub. 2474, supra note 215, at 1.
219

I& at 17 n.73.

Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe from the Republic of Korea, 57
Fed. Reg. 53,693, 53,693 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (final determination of sales
at less than fair value).
221 Id at 53,705.
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